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Averting the Inherent Dangers of
“Going Dark”: Why Congress Must
Require a Locked Front Door to
Encrypted Data
Geoffrey S. Corn*
“I don’t want a back door . . . I want a front door. And I want
the front door to have multiple locks. Big locks.”
—Adm. Michael S. Rogers, Director of the NSA1

I. Introduction
Going dark. Few terms in contemporary national security and
crime control parlance better exemplify the friction between
individual liberty and collective security. Referring both to data “at
rest” and “in motion,” the term is most often used to describe the
effect of encryption technology embedded in commercially
available cell phones and communications technologies that allow
individuals to easily and effectively prevent access to their cell
phone communications and digitally stored data.2 While
* Presidential Research Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law;
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Prior
to joining the faculty at South Texas, Professor Corn served in a variety of
military assignments, including as the Army’s Senior Law of War Advisor,
Supervisory Defense Counsel for the Western United States, Chief of
International Law for U.S. Army Europe, and as a Tactical Intelligence Officer in
Panama. Professor Corn would like to thank his research assistant, Jennifer
Whittington, South Texas College of Law Class of 2016.
1. See Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As Encryption Spreads, U.S.
Grapples with Clash Between Privacy, Security, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-encryption-spreadsus-worries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11
e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html?hpid=z1 (last visited June 20, 2015) (discussing
the different interests in the debate over data privacy) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Remarks at Brookings Institution (Oct.
16, 2014) (explaining the challenge of maintaining national security because of
emerging technologies), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-
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government officials have decried the problem of “going dark” for
several years, their concerns were recently emphasized by Apple
and Google’s decision to make encryption the default setting on
their smartphones. And, unlike earlier encryption capability
embedded in cell phones, this type of encryption is not susceptible
to “front door” access through the use of encryption keys retained
by the cell phone manufacturer and distributor.3 This unqualified
encryption capability is increasingly viewed by democratic
governments as a dangerous evolution of technology available to
the general public.4 From a public security perspective, the
confluence of pervasive use of cell devices to engage in
communication with this encryption creates an unacceptable
obstacle to lawful searches and surveillance that are necessary to
protect the public from criminal and national security threats.5
FBI Director James Comey’s comments about the problem of
“going dark,” given at the Brookings Institute on October 16, 2014,6
have reignited a debate that many believed was dead at the end of
the “crypto-wars” of the 1990s. Since that time, encryption
technologies have flourished within the United States and
globally, in both the public and private sectors.7 Nobody, including
dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course.
3. See Brian Naylor, Apple Says iOS Encryption Protects Privacy; FBI
Raises Crime Fears, NPR (Oct. 8, 2014, 5:17 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
alltechconsidered/2014/10/08/354598527/apple-says-ios-encryption-protects-privacyfbi-raises-crime-fears (last visited June 20, 2015) (discussing concerns about
Apple’s policy on data encryption) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
4. See President Barack Obama & Prime Minister David Cameron,
Remarks in Joint Press Conference, The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary (Jan. 16, 2015) (discussing the potential dangers of data encryption),
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/16/remarkspresident-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint-;
Comey,
supra note 2 (“[T]he FBI has a sworn duty to keep every American safe from crime
and terrorism, and technology has become the tool of choice for some very
dangerous people.”).
5. See Comey, supra note 2 (noting the ability to evade law enforcement as
data encryption becomes more common).
6. See id. (explaining the potential dangers of spreading data encryption).
7. See Global Encryption Software Market 2019–Incidence of Data Breaches
Drives Growth, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/global-encryption-software-market-2019---incidence-of-data-breachesdrives-growth-296759501.html (last visited June 20, 2015) (explaining that
recent data breaches have motivated organizations to encrypt data) (on file with
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Director Comey, would challenge the value of encryption or the
essential role it plays in digital security. Indeed, the government
regularly encourages and promotes the adoption of strong and
well-implemented encryption to protect sensitive data.8 Director
Comey’s comments, however, highlighted the continued and
evolving danger to the public posed by unlimited and irreversible
encryption. The creation of a zone that is essentially immune from
government access would undoubtedly promote privacy, but there
is no question that it will also promote crime. In fact, as many
recent studies have shown, it already has.9 Police face a real and
significant threat that their ability to access evidence, even when
armed with a warrant, will continue to decrease in coming years
as encryption technologies become stronger and easier to
implement. Without legal restrictions, the danger of “going dark”
is palpable and must not be ignored.
Civil libertarians see the issue from a completely different
perspective. Their focus is not the risk to public security that the
government emphasizes, but the risk of abusive government
surveillance tactics that erode individual liberty.10 Citing what
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Kara Swisher, Obama: The Re/Code Interview, RE/CODE (Feb. 15,
2015), http://recode.net/2015/02/15/white-house-red-chair-obama-meets-swisher/
(last visited June 20, 2015) (“[T]here’s no scenario in which we don’t want really
strong encryption.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Security
Tip (ST04-019): Understanding Encryption, US-CERT, https://www.uscert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-019 (last updated Feb. 6, 2013) (last visited June 20,
2015) (explaining how data encryption works) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also, e.g., Smartphone Users Should Be Aware of Malware
Targeting Mobile Devices and the Safety Measures to Help Avoid Compromise,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/sandiego/pressreleases/2012/smartphone-users-should-be-aware-of-malware-targeting-mobiledevices-and-the-safety-measures-to-help-avoid-compromise (last visited June 20,
2015) (providing advice on how to protect your smartphone from hackers) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See Comey, supra note 2 (explaining that the increased use of data
encryption has resulted in increased crime); Andy Greenberg, Over 80 Percent of
Dark-Web Visits Relate to Pedophilia, Study Finds, WIRED (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.wired.com/2014/12/80-percent-dark-web-visits-relate-pedophiliastudy-finds/ (last visited June 20, 2015) (explaining that a great deal of
anonymous internet traffic is directed at pedophilia-related websites) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See Joshua Kopstein, The FBI Wants Apple to Make a Defective Phone,
AL JAZEERA (Oct. 24, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/10/fbisurveillanceappleprivacyencryption.html (last visited June 20, 2015) (discussing
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they believe is a consistent pattern of overzealous and
unconstitutional government surveillance efforts directed against
telephone and computer communications, they applaud the
enhanced protection for individual privacy this technology has
made the norm and not the exception.11
In many ways, the “going dark” debate exemplifies a broader
tension that has, since the inception of our nation, animated the
line between public security and individual liberty. To facilitate
progress in the debate, aides to President Obama are in the midst
of preparing a report that will summarize the ways that the
administration can bridge the gap between the government and
privacy advocates.12 Finding the point of equilibrium between
these two interests was the motivation for protection provided by
the Fourth Amendment and the subsequent extension of these
protections to the states through the conduit of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But these protections are not, and have never been,
understood as absolute. Achieving equilibrium between these
competing interests also demands recognition that the text of the
Fourth Amendment, along with the jurisprudence that has added
established meaning to that text, establishes that restrictions on
government surveillance are not and cannot be absolute.
The proverbial fulcrum upon which this equilibrium must rest
is the test of reasonableness, a concept characterized as the
“touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment by the Supreme Court time
and again. The notion of an absolute or unqualified barrier to
government surveillance is fundamentally inconsistent with this
standard of reasonableness, as it would enable activities that
endanger the public, immune from lawful government detection.
But encryption technology has evolved, and will likely continue to
evolve, to enable the average user of personal communication
devices to “go dark” with little or no effort.13 Does this technology
the wishes of law enforcement agencies for companies to sell phones with less
protected data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See id. (discussing increased efforts to keep data private).
12. See Elise Viebeck, White House Seeks to Break the Encryption Stalemate,
THE HILL (Apr. 13, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/238602-whitehouse-seeks-to-break-encryption-stalemate (last visited June 20, 2015)
(discussing a forthcoming report that details possible approaches law
enforcement can take to access private data if necessary for an investigation) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See Comey, supra note 2 (discussing the prevalence of data encryption in
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shift the fulcrum of the balance of interests at the core of the
Fourth Amendment? Is there a net gain to society of adhering to
the principles that underlie the Fourth Amendment such that the
fulcrum should be reset to its traditional position? If so, should
Congress prohibit the sale or dissemination of communications and
storage technologies that render court-issued search warrants
meaningless? Is there a way to accomplish this without creating
an unacceptable level of risk to the privacy of “The People?”
This Essay argues that the answer to this ultimate question is
an emphatic yes; that to protect the interests of society, Congress
should compel any manufacturer or distributor of communications
and storage technologies that offer encryption as part of any
product they sell or distribute in the United States to build in a
mechanism allowing for lawful government surveillance and
searches of the data stored or transmitted over those devices or
services. Such access should not be through a “back door,” but
instead through a well-documented and tested “front door” that
ensures timely and efficient access to information when lawfully
authorized. This Essay acknowledges the privacy interests
implicated by this requirement; however it also proposes a novel
protective measure to ensure that this requirement will not distort
the balance of interests at the core of the Fourth Amendment:
bifurcated control of encryption keys. Our proposal is that device
manufacturers and communications system developers, whether
domestic or foreign, should be encouraged to incorporate strong
encryption technologies into their products, but they also should
be prohibited from marketing devices or services in the United
States that provide unqualified encryption that would prevent
lawful access to users’ communications and data. Instead,
legislation should require manufacturers and developers to create
encryption keys that would be bifurcated and placed under the
control of the manufacturer and some non-government entity
devoted to privacy protection. Government access to the keys
would therefore require lawful authorization that must satisfy
both entities in control of the keys, either of which would be
authorized, pursuant to statute, to challenge the legality of access.

technological devices).
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II. The Inherent Balance of Fourth Amendment Interests

There are, of course, those who fear that a requirement to
preserve even front door access to communications and stored data
will also facilitate such access when it is not lawfully authorized or
that lawful authorizations will nonetheless permit unjustified
intrusions into individual privacy.14 Essentially, they assert that
the government simply cannot be trusted with any ability to
intrude on people’s privacy, whether authorized or not, and the
encryption technologies that make it increasingly easy for
individual users to “go dark” are a natural and appropriate
response to unacceptable government overreach and intrusions of
privacy. Others argue that the preservation of any “door,” whether
front or back, creates vulnerabilities that cannot be tolerated in a
free society.15
Unfortunately, this endorsement of impenetrable encryption
reflects a dangerous distortion of the balance between government
surveillance authority and individual liberty central to the Fourth
Amendment. Nowhere are the competing interests of collective
societal security and individual liberty more apparent than in the
text of that Amendment. There is no question that the Fourth
Amendment restricted the government’s surveillance authority in
the interests of protecting individual privacy and liberty. Nothing,
however, in the text, history, or subsequent interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment supports the conclusion that it provides an
absolute barrier to such surveillance. Instead, balance is the
operative word: the Fourth Amendment also acknowledged that
the people must be subjected to searches. So long as that search is
14. See Kopstein, supra note 10 (discussing mistrust of government
intrusions).
15. See, e.g., Nakashima & Gellman, supra note 1 (“‘The basic question is, is
it possible to design a completely secure system’ to hold a master key available to
the U.S. government but not adversaries . . . . ‘There’s no way to do this where
you don’t have unintentional vulnerabilities.’”); Carrie Johnson, Privacy
Advocates Don’t Buy FBI’s Warning About Encryption Practices, NPR (Oct. 17,
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/17/356869566/privacy-advocates-don-t-buyfbi-s-warning-about-encryption-practices (last visited June 20, 2015) (“[I]f these
companies are delivering end-to-end encrypted communications, the only logical
way to provide law enforcement access is to escrow a key. And if the keys are
there, whether they are in law enforcement hands, a third party or in the
company’s hands, people will try and steal them.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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reasonable within the meaning of the Amendment, it is lawful and
permissible. In short, the people have never had an absolute and
unqualified right to privacy but instead a right to be secure against
unreasonable government intrusions into those places and things
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the
importance of this balance and that, when assessing the
reasonableness of government surveillance, it is necessary to
acknowledge the government’s interest in effective law
enforcement.16 One need not dig deep to identify this vein of
analysis in many seminal Fourth Amendment decisions. For
example, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,17 the Court addressed the
validity of consent obtained without providing notice of a right to
refuse the officer’s request.18 The Court endorsed a totality of the
circumstances test for assessing the validity of consent and
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that notice of the right to decline
consent is a necessary requirement.19 In the opinion, the Court
emphasized the importance of consent, not in abstract terms, but
in direct connection with the function of law enforcement—solving
crimes:
[I]n situations where the police have some evidence of illicit
activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of
obtaining important and reliable evidence . . . a search
pursuant to consent may result in considerably less
inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly
conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly
legitimate aspect of effective police activity. 20

Later in the opinion, the Court again emphasized the link
between consent and the function of law enforcement, noting that,
“the community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the
16. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (discussing the
need for police questioning); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979) (noting
that the expectation of privacy must be weighed against the government action).
17. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
18. See id. at 223 (discussing voluntariness in responding to questions by
law enforcement).
19. See id. at 225–30 (noting that officers are not required to inform
individuals of the right to decline consent).
20. Id. at 227–28.
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resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and
prosecution of crime . . . .”21
Of course, issues related to encryption of communications and
stored data do not implicate consent. However, like consent, they
clearly implicate the balance between the need to enable effective
government surveillance and individual privacy. And there is
perhaps an even more important link to Bustamonte: overly
restrictive standards that frustrate legitimate law enforcement
surveillance efforts conflict with the Fourth Amendment’s core
objective. Indeed, this was the primary basis for the Court’s
rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that notice of a right to
decline consent was a dispositive requirement for validity. As the
Court noted,
The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent
searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect
of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible
touchstone. To approve such searches without the most careful
scrutiny would sanction the possibility of official coercion; to
place artificial restrictions upon such searches would jeopardize
their basic validity. Just as was true with confessions, the
requirement of a “voluntary” consent reflects a fair
accommodation of the constitutional requirements involved.22

Allowing device manufacturers and communications service
providers to embed technologies in their products that make it
impossible for the government to gain access to an individual’s
data is the surveillance analogue to the “artificial restriction” on
lawful government activity that the Court condemned in
Bustamonte.23 In fact, such encryption is even more incompatible
with the Fourth Amendment’s inherent balance because unlimited
use of encryption technology is not intended to impose a
“restriction” on lawful surveillance—it is intended to impose a
complete prohibition.
Concededly, prohibiting this type of encryption will force
individuals to assume some increased risk of unauthorized access.
Indeed, this seems to be the principal argument in support of both

21. Id. at 243.
22. Id. at 229.
23. See id. (discussing the dangers of placing unnecessary restrictions on
police searches).
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the necessity and legitimacy of such encryption.24 But the risk that
the government will abuse its authority and engage in unlawful
surveillance cannot justify a complete barrier to lawful
surveillance. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment itself tolerates such
risk by allowing for lawful government searches and surveillance
in the first place.
Accordingly, addressing the validity of “going dark” encryption
should not focus on whether prohibiting such encryption creates a
risk of unlawful government access to information but instead
whether the risk it creates is necessary to preserve the inherent
balance of Fourth Amendment interests. Moreover, the weight of
the risk must be evaluated on the basis of how much it can be
mitigated through technological and legislative solutions, allowing
for a meaningful cost-risk analysis. Indeed, this more precise risk
assessment was endorsed by none other than Justice Marshall in
his dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland,25 ironically the
decision that provides the foundation for almost all arguments in
support of government collection of communications metadata. In
Smith, the Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed from a private telephone in an
individual’s home because the numbers are divulged to the third
party phone company.26 Accordingly, government access to those
numbers in no way implicated the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.27
Justice Marshall rejected this conclusion. In his view, the
“exposed to a third party” touchstone for assessing the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, and the accordant
applicability of the Fourth Amendment, was invalid.28 Instead,
Justice Marshall believed that the nature of functioning in a free
society necessitated its citizens to divulge certain information—in

24. See Kopstein, supra note 10 (discussing the benefits of data encryption).
25. See Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 735 (1979) (weighing the risk of
government interference).
26. See id. at 745–46 (explaining that privacy expectations should be lower
because the information has already been given to a third party).
27. See id. (discussing the fact that government access to that information
does not unreasonably interfere with privacy expectations).
28. See id. at 748–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing against the thirdparty doctrine in the majority opinion).
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this case phone numbers.29 Thus, Justice Marshall rejected the
conclusion that an individual forfeited an expectation of privacy in
information simply by disclosing it to a third party.30 Rather, he
argued, the real test was not “whether privacy expectations are
legitimate [based] on the risks an individual can be presumed to
accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the
risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society.”31
Justice Marshall’s view of the “Third Party Doctrine” seems to
be gaining new momentum as courts struggle to apply the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirements to increasingly ubiquitous
digital storage devices. Judges across the United States, from
magistrates to the Supreme Court, are becoming increasingly
persuaded that somehow the dynamics have shifted as a result of
these “super-storage” containers. This struggle was reflected in the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in United States v. Jones32 and
Riley v. California.33 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence reflected
this struggle—arguing that what society is willing to accept as a
reasonable expectation of privacy should turn not so much on the
information an individual exposes to the public but instead on
whether the collection of that information is so extensive as to
“alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way
that is inimical to democratic society.”34 Thus, Justice Sotomayor
seeks to revive Justice Marshall’s view when arguing that “it may
be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties.”35
29. See id. (noting that calling a phone number should not kill any
expectation of privacy).
30. See id. (disagreeing with the third-party doctrine that the Court
adopted).
31. Id. at 750.
32. 132 S. Ct. 945, 946 (2012) (introducing the difficulty in applying existing
doctrine to emerging technologies).
33. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (discussing the reasonableness of searching
information stored in a cell phone without a warrant).
34. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (citing United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d
272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)).
35. Id. at 957 (“I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed
to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is not a discrete commodity,
possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or
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This theme continues in Riley, where the Supreme Court
considered whether the police could search a cellular telephone
incident to arrest.36 The Court’s opinion in Riley, which overturned
well-established precedents, hinged entirely on the fact that such
a great deal of data could be stored in a modern smartphone.37
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts concluded, such devices are simply
quantitatively and “qualitatively different.”38
Ironically, Justice Marshall’s more restrictive standard for
assessing applicability of Fourth Amendment protections provides
a compelling justification for restricting “going dark” encryption.
Prohibiting such unlimited encryption would, to some extent,
increase the risk of unlawful government access (although, as
explained below, probably not nearly as much as many privacy
advocates would have the public believe). But this risk is inherent
phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this
information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”))).
36. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480 (questioning the constitutionality of
warrantless cell phone searches).
37. See id. at 2489 (considering the storage capability of current technology).
38. Id. at 2490. Some courts and scholars pushed this argument further,
asserting that even searches conducted pursuant to warrants should be strictly
constrained in their scope when applied to digital devices due to the enormous
amounts of data those devices can store. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2009), opinion revised and
superseded, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the need to protect privacy
interests); see also In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 160 (D.D.C.
2014) (denying a search warrant to search an iPhone); In re Search of Black
iPhone, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 78 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing the risk of the government
gaining access to too much private information); In re Search of Odys Loox Plus
Tablet, 28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 44–46 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing issues that arise from
a search warrant request’s lack of clarity in how law enforcement will search the
cell phone); In re The Search of premises known as: a Nextel Cellular Telephone,
No. 14–MJ–8005–DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, at *3–7 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014)
(denying a search warrant because the application failed to meet the particularity
requirement). Those arguing that digital searches are so different as to require
entirely new protocols to control searches seem to believe that the Framers of the
Constitution could never have imagined allowing searches of containers that
could hold so much personal information. Yet that is exactly what the Framers
contemplated when they made abundantly clear that the government should have
the authority to search homes—the most sacrosanct of all protected areas. One
could argue that the “quantitative and qualitative” differences of modern
electronic devices is that they compile much more information than would ever
have occurred in the eighteenth century. While this is true, we should also recall
that polymaths like George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison
were notoriously meticulous in documenting and storing their thoughts,
communications, and even business records in their homes.
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in all government search and surveillance capabilities and is
tolerated by the Fourth Amendment. More importantly, this is a
risk that members of a free society must accept as a necessary cost
to protecting the broader societal interest in facilitating lawful
access to evidence. In contrast, preventing access altogether would
not only protect individuals from unreasonable searches, but also
would protect them from any search, thereby frustrating the
legitimate governmental and societal interest in discovering crime
and protecting national security. And this interest is far from
speculative.
Allowing the continued development and use of “going dark”
encryption will ultimately distort the balance at the core of the
Fourth Amendment. Preserving that balance necessitates a
fundamentally different approach: the preservation of “front door”
access with a carefully constructed mechanism to guard that front
door against unlawful entry. Such a balanced approach is both
necessary and feasible.
III. Front Door Access and the “Split Key” Mechanism
Many critics of both “going dark” and efforts to restrict such
encryption address the issue through extremes. On one end of the
spectrum, advocates for privacy rights emphasize the risk that
government collusion with cell device manufacturers will make
access to encryption keys too easy, leading to inevitable abuse.39
On the other end of the spectrum, advocates for public and national
security emphasize the dangers of keyless encryption and how that
danger necessitates government access to manufacturer
encryption keys.40
39. See Mike Masnick, Everybody Knows FBI Director James Comey Is
Wrong About Encryption, Even the FBI, TECHDIRT (Oct. 20, 2014, 10:22 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141019/07115528878/everybody-knows-fbidirector-james-comey-is-wrong-about-encryption-even-fbi.shtml (last visited
June 20, 2015) (discussing the current state of data encryption) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See Eric Chabrow, Obama Sees Need for Encryption Backdoor, BANK
INFO SECURITY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/cameronobama-a-7809/op-1 (last visited June 20, 2015) (explaining a few of the different
approaches to allowing government access of encrypted information) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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There is, however, a solution to this problem that, like the
Fourth Amendment itself, strikes a credible balance between these
two extremes: a “split key” approach. Under this approach, to
protect the government’s interest in lawful access to encrypted
data, manufacturers would be required, by statute, to preserve
encryption keys for the devices and services they produce and
distribute in the United States. To mitigate the risk of unlawful
government access as the result of collusion with manufacturers or
the abuse of the manufacturers themselves, these keys would be
“split” and retained by two (or more) distinct entities: the
manufacturer and a privacy rights organization.
The advantages of this “split key” approach are obvious.
Unlike “going dark” encryption, the government’s interest in
efficient lawful access to encrypted data would be preserved. By
splitting control of the encryption key between two entities—one
of which would neither be susceptible to government pressure nor
profit motives, but instead devoted to protecting the privacy
interests of the public—the risk of unlawful government access
would be substantially reduced.
Such an approach is obviously contrary to the objectives of
some privacy advocates, most notably those who have launched a
series of retorts intent on snuffing out the development of
mechanisms to preserve efficient lawful access to cell data.41 The
polemic aims to discredit the very concept of allowing any
government access whatsoever to encrypted data and
communications, suggesting that such access can only be achieved
by building defects into the encryption.42 These opponents frame
efforts to preserve such access as a call for the creation of “back
doors” that can be exploited by the United States and any other
government.43 They argue that the creation of back doors will
introduce unacceptable vulnerabilities in products and systems44
41. See With Liberty to Monitor All, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 28, 2014),
http://www.hrw.org/node/127362/section/2 (last visited June 20, 2015) (providing
a summary of a 120-page report that “documents how government surveillance
and secrecy are undermining press freedom, the public’s right to information, and
the right to counsel, all human rights essential to a healthy democracy”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. See id. (opposing any changes that would make data less secure).
43. See id. (same).
44. Some have argued that the creation of additional encryption keys will be
an attractive target for hackers no matter where they are stored. While that is
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and point to examples where, in the past, such vulnerabilities have
been exploited by hackers.45
To be clear, this “split key” proposal is not a subterfuge method
of creating “back door” access to data. It, like Director Comey,
seeks to achieve preservation of “front door” access to encrypted
communications. This might seem like a minor distinction, but it
is not, as those who have misrepresented Comey’s comments
understand perfectly. Unlike a “back door,” which generally refers
to an undisclosed vulnerability in an application or device, a front
door is a well-documented and clear mechanism for both
encrypting and decrypting data, whether it be data in motion
(communications) or at rest (stored data). To be secure, encryption
should be subject to rigorous testing. Thus, its presence should be
open to the public and available for attack, both in laboratories and
in the real world. This is the only way to truly evaluate the
trustworthiness of encryption, with vulnerabilities being corrected
as they are discovered, to constantly strengthen the protocol and
its implementation. Essentially, a front door is the digital
true, it must be acknowledged that hackers, like all logical actors, recognize that
a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Thus, hackers generally seek the
path of least resistance to achieve their goals. It would generally be much easier
for a hacker to compromise a user’s device through a Trojan horse or to obtain
their credentials through social engineering than it would be to hack into two or
more well protected systems. Moreover, despite modern society’s obsession with
connectivity, nothing requires a database maintaining encryption keys to be
connected to the Internet. Thus, such a database could be immensely more secure
than encryption keys or passwords found on users’ devices.
45. See Johnson, supra note 15 (noting that fears about data insecurity are
valid “since foreign governments have already found a way to hack into major
American tech companies”); The Lawfare Podcast, Episode #98: Chris Soghoian
Responds to FBI Director James Comey LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 1, 2014),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-episode-98-chris-soghoian-responds-fbidirector-james-comey (last visited June 20, 2015) (discussing potential problems
with weak data security) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
Athens Affair, cited by Soghoian in this podcast, is probably the most frequently
referenced example of the danger of creating “back doors” in communications
networks. It is, however, a poor example that speaks more to the need for solid
network security than it does to the creation of back doors. For an explanation of
how Vodafone’s failure to purchase and install Ericsson’s Intercept Management
System allowed this hack to occur, see Vassilis Prevelakis & Diomidis Spinellis,
The Athens Affair: How Some Extremely Smart Hackers Pulled Off the Most
Audacious Cell-Network Break-in Ever, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 29, 2007),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair (last visited June 20,
2015) (discussing a major hack of cell phone data in Greece) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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equivalent of a big, ingeniously engineered lock on the only
entrance to an otherwise secure building. It is a lock that has been
tested by every available lock picker and found to be secure, with
any identified weaknesses being constantly fixed. Such a lock is
always superior to a secret entrance in the rear of a building.
When presented with the option of using the front door versus
the back door, law enforcement will always choose the former, and
nobody is suggesting that there should be any imperfections built
into the front door lock. The only question is: Who should have
access to the key, and under what circumstances? One could
imagine leaving the key to such a lock in the hands of the
manufacturer, the police, or even locked inside another container
with a similar lock. All of these scenarios carry different, but
manageable, risks. They are also available just as much in the
digital world as the real world—in fact more so, as encryption
likely is stronger than the most ingenious physical lock ever
created.
There is no reason, as is often assumed, that the key to the
lock must be placed solely in the hands of the government or the
manufacturer, both of which could be motivated by perverse
incentives and thereby present risks, as Justice Marshall might
argue, that are unacceptable for members of a free society. The
split key model mitigates this risk and allows for the preservation
of secure, timely, and efficient front door access to evidence when
lawfully authorized; splitting the key to provide that access will
align the inherent risk of improper access with what should be
demanded of a free society.
IV. Splitting the Key
The use of split key encryption to lock access to data
significantly mitigates the concern that a duplicate or escrow key
will be abused. An encryption key itself can not only be split into
discrete parts and stored separately; it can be encapsulated within
other “containers” of encrypted data.46 Each container can be
placed in the possession of another entity, requiring cooperation by
two or more entities to unlock the series of keys to decrypt the
46. See supra Part III (introducing the split key approach and its
advantages).
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cipher text into plain text47. Thus, for example, the manufacturer
of a device could hold one portion of the key, or a key to an
encapsulated container.48 A privacy group could hold another
key.49 Only by combining all parts of the key could the cipher text
be returned to plain text.50 If and when the government sought the
use of the encryption key, it would bear the burden to satisfy both
custodians that access is authorized by law, in most cases as the
result of a lawful order. Each custodian would then be in a position
to assess the legal basis and contest the order if it believed the
access to be improper. Thus, only when both custodians validated
the legal basis for access, each of which approaching the question
with differing interests, would decryption occur.51 This split key
option preserves privacy, security, and the government’s ability to
obtain evidence when authorized.
Implementing this split key approach would necessitate a
statutory mandate to create, split, and retain encryption keys.
Imposition of such a mandate is well within the authority of the
federal government as an exercise of its regulation of interstate
commerce and communications.52 A closely related example of such
a mandate can be found in the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA).53 While this statute does not require
decryption, it does reflect the logical balance between privacy and
public security by imposing an obligation on telecommunication
providers to build into their systems lawful intercept capabilities.
According to a Congressional Research Service report on CALEA:

47. See supra Part III (explaining what split key encryption may look like).
48. See supra Part III (articulating an approach that affords manufacturers
autonomy while ensuring their accountability).
49. If Congress so desired, it could place additional keys, or portions of keys,
in the hands of other entities—for example, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts or an ombudsman.
50. See supra Part III (explaining how the split key model allows for secure,
timely, and efficient access to encrypted data).
51. See supra Part III (arguing that splitting control of the encryption key
between two or more entities with diverging interests would substantially reduce
the risk of unlawful government access to encrypted data).
52. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (analogizing to the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act as a basis for authority to
mandate a split key approach to data encryption).
53. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012).
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CALEA is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement
officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and
efficiently, despite the deployment of new digital technologies
and wireless services by the telecommunications industry.
CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their
equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they are able
to comply with authorized electronic surveillance. 54

The same report also emphasizes that CALEA was never
intended to expand law enforcement surveillance authority, but
instead:
[O]nly to ensure that after law enforcement obtains the
appropriate legal authority, carriers will have the necessary
capabilities and sufficient capacity to assist law enforcement in
conducting digital electronic surveillance regardless of the
specific telecommunications systems or services deployed.55

For this purpose, the statute requires telecommunication
providers to be able to respond expeditiously to government
surveillance orders, including the requirement to “consult with
telecommunications equipment manufacturers to develop
equipment necessary to comply with the capability and capacity
requirements identified by the FBI.”56
But CALEA also offers the type of safeguards a split-key
decryption requirement would incorporate. First, it requires
telecommunications carriers “to ensure that any interception of
communications or access to call-identifying information that is
conducted within their premises can only be done with a court
order.”57 Second, it provides for a certain degree of execution
oversight, in that it also requires the affirmative intervention of an
individual officer or employee of the carrier acting in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Federal Communications
Commission.58
CALEA is a useful model for the split-key decryption statute
that would facilitate lawful access to communications and stored
54. PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30677, DIGITAL
SURVEILLANCE: THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT 2
(2007), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30 677.pdf.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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data.59 Like CALEA, the split-key option reflects a compromise
between public security and individual privacy, ensuring lawful
access to data while mitigating the risk of unlawful access or
investigatory overreach.60 And, like CALEA, it reflects the reality
that the risk of improper access resulting from the requirement is
within the range of risk necessary to further the legitimate public
safety and national security interests related to surveillance.61 A
clear and simple mandate to develop and maintain split encryption
keys and to include a provision that provides standing to the
custodians of the split encryption keys to enable them to challenge
the legality of any access request will produce an analogous
balance in the realm of encrypted data.
V. Responding to the Inevitable Criticisms
Like CALEA, a statutory obligation along the lines proposed
herein will inevitably trigger criticisms and generate concerns.62
One obvious criticism is that the creation of an escrow key or the
maintenance of a duplicate key by a manufacturer would introduce
an unacceptable risk of compromise for the device.63 This argument
presupposes that the risk is significant, that the costs of its
exploitation are large, and that the benefit is not worth the risk.
Yet manufacturers, product developers, service providers, and
users constantly introduce such risks. Nearly every feature or bit
of code added to a device introduces a risk, some greater than
others. The vulnerabilities that have been introduced to computers
by software such as Flash, ActiveX controls, Java, and web
59. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (explaining that CALEA
provides a closely related example for such a mandate).
60. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (noting the balance struck
between privacy and public security by CALEA).
61. See supra Part III (noting that the split key approach better aligns the
inherent risk of improper access with the necessity of protecting the broader
societal interest in facilitating lawful access to evidence).
62. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (noting that criticisms
stem from concern over unlawful facilitation of access to communication and the
potential for unjustified intrusions into individual privacy even when
communications are lawfully accessed).
63. See supra notes 15, 39–40 and accompanying text (noting that opponents
frame efforts to preserve such access as a call for the creation of easily exploitable
“back doors”).
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browsers are well documented.64 The ubiquitous SQL database,
while extremely effective at helping web designers create effective
data driven websites, is notorious for its vulnerability to SQL
injection attacks.65 Adding microphones to electronic devices
opened the door to aural interceptions.66 Similarly, the
introduction of cameras has resulted in unauthorized video
surveillance of users.67 Consumers accept all of these risks,
however, because we, as individual users and as a society, have
concluded that they are worth the cost.
Some will inevitably argue that no new possible
vulnerabilities should be introduced into devices to allow the
government to execute reasonable, and therefore lawful, searches
for unique and otherwise unavailable evidence. However, this
argument implicitly asserts that such a feature is either of no value
or merely insignificant value to society. Herein lies the Achilles’
heel to opponents of mandated front-door access: the conclusion is
entirely at odds with the inherent balance between individual
liberty and collective security central to the Fourth Amendment
itself.68 Nor should lawmakers be deluded into believing that the
64. See, e.g., Ed Bott, Microsoft to Block Outdated Java Versions in Internet
Explorer, ZDNET.COM (Aug. 6, 2014, 11:54 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/
microsoft-to-block-outdated-java-versions-in-internet-explorer/ (last visited June
18, 2015) (noting that such software, while easily accessible and useful, can be
easily used against users in potentially dangerous ways) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See Gery Menegaz, SQL Injection Attack: What It Is and How to Prevent
It, ZDNET.COM (July 13, 2012, 12:13 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/sqlinjection-attack-what-is-it-and-how-to-prevent-it/ (last visited June 18, 2015)
(explaining why SQL Injection attacks are so common) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Laurent Simon & Ross Anderson, PIN Skimmer: Inferring PINs
Through the Camera and Microphone, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ACM
WORKSHOP ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONES & MOBILE DEVICES 67
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/pinskimmer_spsm13.pdf
(discussing how phone cameras, microphones, and other sensors can be used as
powerful, cheap, and convenient spying tools).
67. See Rebecca Abrahams & Stephen Bryen, Your Computer and Phone
Cameras Are On—Beware!, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2014, 5:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-abrahams/your-computer--phone-came_
b_5398896.html (last visited June 18, 2015) (noting that spying through
smartphone cameras, computer webcams, laptops, and tablets is widespread
practice by various governments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
68. See supra Part II (maintaining that allowing for unqualified absolute

1452

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1433 (2015)

currently existing vulnerabilities that we live with on a daily basis
are less significant in scope than the possibility of obtaining
complete access to the encrypted contents of a device. Various
malware variants that are so widespread as to be almost
omnipresent in our online community achieve just such access
through what would seem like minor cracks in the defense of
systems.69
One example is the Zeus malware strain, which has been tied
to the unlawful online theft of hundreds of millions of dollars from
United States companies and citizens and gives its operator
complete access to and control over any computer it infects.70 It can
be installed on a machine through the simple mistake of viewing
an infected website or email, or clicking on an otherwise innocuous
link.71 The malware is designed to not only bypass malware
detection software, but also to deactivate the software’s ability to
detect it.72 Zeus and the many other variants of malware that are
freely available to purchasers on dark-net websites and forums are
responsible for the theft of funds from countless online bank
accounts (the credentials having been stolen by the malware’s keylogger features), the theft of credit card information, and
innumerable personal identifiers.73
encryption will ultimately distort the balance at the core of the Fourth
Amendment).
69. See Malware Creation Increasing, Trojans Most Popular Attack, TREND
MICRO (Nov. 28, 2014), http://blog.trendmicro.com/malware-creation-increasingtrojans-popular-attack/ (last visited June 18, 2015) (noting that malware creation
“has been growing at an unprecedented rate” and the global infection ratio has
been increasing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See GameOver Zeus Botnet Disrupted, FBI (June 2, 2014),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/june/gameover-zeus-botnet-disrupted (last
visited June 18, 2015) (announcing that the collaborative effort among
international partners to disrupt GameOver Zeus and Cryptolocker have proven
successful, and that “significant progress has been made in remediating
computers infected with the GameOver Zeus”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
71. See id. (noting that the infection was predominantly spread through
spam e-mail or phishing messages).
72. See id. (noting that the malware was able to download and install
additional malware, which was then used to extract banking credentials and
facilitate the illegal withdrawal of funds from individuals and businesses).
73. See id. (“In the case of GameOver Zeus, its primary purpose is to capture
banking credentials from infected computers, then use those credentials to
initiate or re-direct wire transfers to accounts overseas that are controlled by the
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Critics of requiring preservation of “front-door access” will
likely also argue that society will be better served by pursuing the
unrestrained development of encryption technology. These two
approaches are not, however, incompatible. However, it is both
naïve and dangerous to fail to recognize—and account for—the
reality that some of these advances bring with them risks that
must be managed at a societal level. Ultimately, individual choices
or actions will not be sufficient to diminish or minimize such risks.
Some suggest that any restriction on the evolution of encryption
technology is the digital equivalent to prohibiting development of
the automobile. This type of hyperbole distorts the issue. If there
is an analogue, it is more appropriately characterized as simply
requiring the development of safety mechanisms as the automobile
evolves. Industry is today capable of this type of more cautious and
responsible development of encryption technology. Few could
reasonably argue that it would have been more efficient to design
the automobile with safety features at the outset, rather than
trying to cobble together solutions to the dangers they impose at a
later date. This is the opportunity available in relation to
encryption.
Is there precedent for using a split key approach to encryption?
Absolutely. It may surprise some to learn that the security of the
entire Internet domain system is, essentially, being protected by a
split key approach.74
Why, however, should the government interfere with the freemarket evolution of encryption technology, imposing a
requirement to incorporate and preserve “front door access” to
data? The answer is twofold. First, the market is producing an
criminals. Losses attributable to GameOver Zeus are estimated to be more than
$100 million.”).
74. See Adam Hadhazy, Internet ‘Key Holders’ Are Insurance Against Cyber
Attack, LIVESCIENCE (July 29, 2010, 5:48 AM), http://www.livescience.com/6791internet-key-holders-insurance-cyber-attack.html (last visited June 18, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
At least five key-holding members of this fellowship would have to
meet at a secure data center in the United States to reboot this socalled Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) in case of
a very unlikely system collapse. ‘If you round up five of these guys,
they can decrypt [the root key] should the West Coast fall in the water
and the East Coast get hit by a nuclear bomb,’ Richard Lamb, program
manager for DNSSEC at ICANN, told TechNewsDaily.
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outcome in conflict with the Fourth Amendment’s central and
essential balance of interests.75 Second, the market-driven
evolution of encryption technology distorts this balance because
the costs of the dangers imposed by the technology are externalized
to society, rather than internalized by the manufacturer or
individual users.76 When the costs of market-driven
development—in this case, frustration of lawful government
surveillance efforts—are so widespread among society, the market
impact is diluted and cannot produce a rational influence. It is
precisely in such situations that governmental action is required
to avoid the common pool problem—the “race to the bottom” as
described in the law and economics theory.
Arguably, the market would drive manufacturers to include
such “front door access” features if doing so was perceived by the
consumer to be in her best interest.77 But because the vast majority
of users will be more interested in the security of their data than
in the ability of the government to gain access to that data in the
course of lawful surveillance activities, the societal interest is
poorly aligned with market forces.78 Only when individuals are
directly affected by the inability of the government to access such
information will they have any motivation to complain. This may
result in the occasional article or outcry by the victim of a crime,
but it is unlikely to shift the balance of public opinion, or more
importantly, to make such an impact on the sales of a given
product as to alter market oriented encryption development. This
is true despite the fact that the cost to the victim will likely be
75. See supra Part II (noting that an absolute barrier to government
surveillance is fundamentally inconsistent with the reasonableness standard of
the Fourth Amendment).
76. See supra Part II (noting that preventing access altogether would
frustrate the legitimate governmental interest in discovering crime and
protecting national security).
77. See supra Part IV (noting that such drivers would reflect a logical
balance between privacy and public security by way of imposition of an obligation
on telecommunication providers to build lawful intercept capabilities into their
systems).
78. See Kevin Poulson, Apple’s iPhone Encryption Technology Is a Godsend,
Even If Cops Hate It, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.
com/2014/10/golden-key/ (last visited June 18, 2015) (“With an eye to market
demand, the company has taken a bold step to the side of privacy, making strong
crypto the default for the wealth of personal information stored on the iPhone.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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exponentially greater than the benefits to users of the device
lacking the feature. Thus, legislation or government regulation is
appropriate to ensure that such features are included.
None of these considerations will persuade everyone that
mandated front door access is a necessary measure to preserve a
credible and effective balance between individual liberty and
public security.79 There will always be critics who fear that no
matter how carefully the law controls access to an encryption key
to the front door, it will be abused and result in unauthorized
access.80 Others are concerned that even authorized use of the key,
while lawful, will nonetheless permit unjustified intrusions into
individual privacy.81 These fears, however, are inherent in any
government search and surveillance capability and have been
historically managed effectively. Thus, the first of these fears is
fairly easily managed. As for the second, it is the People—
represented by Congress and the state legislatures and limited by
the Constitution—that decide when privacy rights trump the
government’s need to obtain evidence. As described above, in
United States jurisprudence, this balance has consistently
weighed in favor of government access to evidence; nothing about
encryption should change this conclusion.
VI. Conclusion
The risks related to “going dark” are real. When the President
of the United States,82 the Prime Minister of the United

79. See supra Part II (conceding that there are those who fear that a
requirement to preserve even front door access to communications and stored
data will also facilitate such access when it is not lawfully authorized).
80. See supra Part II (noting that these same skeptics will attack even lawful
authorizations for access to encrypted data as nonetheless permitting unjustified
intrusions into individual privacy).
81. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (noting that such critics
assert that government simply cannot be trusted with any ability to intrude on
people’s privacy, whether authorized or not).
82. Nakashima & Gellman, supra note 1.
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Kingdom,83 and the Director of the FBI84 all publicly express deep
concerns about how this phenomenon will endanger their
respective nations, it is difficult to ignore. Today, encryption
technologies that are making it increasingly easy for individual
users to prevent even lawful government access to potentially vital
information related to crimes or other national security threats.
This evolution of individual encryption capabilities represents a
fundamental distortion of the balance between government
surveillance authority and individual liberty central to the Fourth
Amendment. And balance is the operative word. The right of the
people to be secure against unreasonable government intrusions
into those places and things protected by the Fourth Amendment
must be vehemently protected. Reasonable searches, however,
should not only be permitted, but they should be mandated where
necessary.
Congress has the authority to ensure that such searches are
possible. While some argue that this could cause American
manufacturers to suffer, saddled as they will appear to be by the
“Snowden Effect,” the rules will apply equally to any manufacturer
that wishes to do business in the United States. Considering that
the United States economy is the largest in the world, it is highly
unlikely that foreign manufacturers will forego access to its
market to avoid having to create CALEA-like solutions to allow for
lawful access to encrypted data. Just as foreign cellular telephone
providers, such as T-Mobile, are active in the United States, so too
will foreign device manufacturers and other communications
services adjust their technology to comply with our laws and
regulations. This will put American and foreign companies on an
equal playing field while encouraging ingenuity and competition.
Most importantly, “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects” will be protected not only
“against unreasonable searches and seizures,”85 but also against

83. James Ball, Cameron Wants to Ban Encryption—He Can Say Goodbye to
Digital Britain, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2015/jan/13/cameron-ban-encryption-digital-britain-online-shoppingbanking-messaging-terror (last visited July 10, 2015) (discussing David Cameron’s
views on data encryption) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
84. Comey, supra note 2.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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attacks by criminals and terrorists. And is this not, in essence, the
primary purpose of government?

